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FICTIONAL DOCUMENTARIES AND
TRUTHFUL FICTIONS: THE DEATH
PENALTY IN RECENT AMERICAN FILM
David R. Dow*
When it comes to death, most Hollywood movies cheat.
They cheat by tinkering with the truth, because the truth as it actually is is too complex or too disturbing to confront honestly.
(The so-called happy ending is the most famous form of such
cheating.) They cheat because people generally prefer happiness and simplicity to darkness and complexity, especially where
their entertainment is concerned, and filmmakers tend to give
people what they want.
Even great movies cheat. For example, last year's Oscar
winner for best picture, American Beauty, cheats egregiously.
The movie (for the one or two of you who have not seen it) deals
with modern times: It is about suburbia, men and women who
mindlessly pursue meaningless careers, bigotry, and finally, hope
and redemption. In the end, the character played by Kevin
Spacey is murdered. This is not a surprise ending because the
Spacey character narrates the movie in a voice-over, and he tells
us as the movie opens that in less than a year he will no longer
be alive. We know at the beginning that 110 minutes later Kevin
Spacey's character will be dead.
Spacey plays a morally ambiguous character. He is in the
midst of a full-blown mid-life crisis. He is a lousy husband and a
worse father. For virtually the entire length of the film, he lusts
after his daughter's high school classmate. In the end, however,
he gently rebuffs a neighbor's homosexual advance and-again

* George Butler Research Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center.
I am grateful to the Butler Foundation and the University of Houston Law Foundation,
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meeting of the American Culture Association and Popular Culture Association. Finally,
I am thankful to Suzanna Sherry and Mark Dow for reading and commenting on earlier
versions of this essay.
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gently-declines to have intercourse with the high school cheerleader who is lying pants-less on his couch. The message here is
not subtle: Spacey redeems himself, in this movie about figurative death and spiritual renewal, and just as he does so, he gets
shot.
This bloody ending would be at least a little depressingexcept that the Spacey character is still talking; he continues the
narrative voice-over even after his brains have been blown out
and blood is pouring from his head. We see him lifeless but can
believe that he is not dead because we hear him still full of life.
Through this narrative technique, Spacey stays alive despite having been murdered. He even tells us what it is like to be dead,
and thereby blunts the tragedy of his death. In science fiction or
fantasy, dead people can keep talking, but in a realist film-and
this movie's power is its stark realism; there may not be an untrue or unreal sentence in the entire script-narration from a
dead man is cheating.
Death penalty movies cheat as well. Unlike American
Beauty, they cannot cheat by having an execution victim remain
alive (although The Green Mile, which I discuss below, comes
close to this mode of cheating). Instead, they cheat by featuring
an innocent inmate: someone who, by nearly anyone's estimation, deserves to be living. This focus is their mode of distraction, their mode of avoiding moral complexity. Death penalty
movies that focus on innocence cheat because they allow the
viewer to be certain that the protagonist ought not to be killed;
such movies permit viewers to oppose a death penalty without
opposing the death penalty. In real life, we do not have that indulgence.
When death penalty movies cheat, they obscure the fundamental moral questions that the death penalty involves. One
might expect documentaries to be more real and Hollywood
productions to be less so, but one would be wrong. Exactly the
opposite is true. Documentaries cheat much more than Hollywood movies. Most (though not all) documentaries cheat by focusing almost exclusively on the issue of innocence, whereas
many Hollywood movies willingly grapple with moral complexity by featuring at least one guilty inmate. 1 Moreover, although

I. There are notable exceptions to my thesis. In particular, many Hollywood movies, including To Kill a Mockingbird, True Crime, and The Chamber, cheat in the same
way I am critical of in this essay: by focusing entirely on innocence. On the other hand, I
Want to Live and Last Dance, also Hollywood productions, do not cheat, nor does the
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the focus on innocence might seem innocuous, it is in fact rather
pernicious, because it contributes to the increasingly widespread
view that there is no great harm in violating a person's rights as
long as we are certain that the person is guilty.
My thesis, then, is that fiction is more true than nonfiction,
and I will illustrate this thesis by examining four principal films,
two documentaries and two Hollywood movies. The documentaries are The Thin Blue Line (TBL), which deals with a former
inmate of death row in Texas named Randall Dale Adams, and
Fourteen Days in May (FDM), which deals with a former inmate
of death row in Mississippi named Edward Earl Johnson. Adams was released; Johnson was executed. The two Hollywood
films are Dead Man Walking (DMW) and The Green Mile
(TGM). Both involve fictional murderers, and both are set on
Louisiana's death row. DMW, though based on a work of nonfiction/ is itself fiction; it centers around an inmate of death row
who is a composite of multiple murderers rather than a single
accused. TGM is based on a work by Stephen King, 3 so it should
come as no surprise that the film combines realism with supernaturalism, and it is therefore an achievement of heroic proportions that this film does not cheat.
The ironies implicit in my argument are numerous and
multi-dimensional. Thus, The Thin Blue Line is a movie that
cheats because it is the story of an inmate wrongfully accused,
yet it literally resulted in the saving of an innocent man's life.
Dead Man Walking does not cheat in the slightest, but whether it
affects the real world to even the slightest degree is open to
question. Fourteen Days in May cheats by suggesting that the
executed inmate is innocent, but without letting us see the supposedly exculpatory witness. The Green Mile shows the execution of someone we know is innocent, yet it also shows two other
executions where the guilt of the inmate is not in question, as
well as showing a particularly hateful criminal get murdered in
prison. In this sense, TGM simultaneously provokes in the
viewers discomfort with the death penalty (we see nonviolent as

documentary The Execwion Protocol, which addresses the death penalty in Missouri. I
do not discuss British films, including 10 Rillington Place and Ler Him Have Ir, the former of which focuses on innocence and the latter of which focuses on youth and mental
retardation.
·
2. Helen Prejean. Dead Man \\'a/king: An Eye~>·irness Accowll of rhe Dearh Penairy in rhe Unired Srares (Vintage Books. 1994 ).
3. The sixth and final part of the serial novel The Green Mile was published in
1996
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well as innocent men get electrocuted) and also satisfaction
when we see a vile criminal suddenly shot. This very conflict is
as common as it is inexplicable, and TGM is the only one of the
films to evoke it. In short, the documentaries are false and the
fiction is true.
This essay consists of two major sections. In Part I, I address the death penalty regime in America. The discussion combines a summary of recent research as well as anecdotal evidence
based on my own experience of representing death row inmates.
In Part II, I turn to the films and argue that, although death penalty documentaries are fine and gripping films, the Hollywood
productions do a far better job of illuminating the entirety of the
death penalty world. The documentaries, like the popular media
in the United States, exemplify a transfixion with the problem of
executing an innocent man. To be sure, the execution of an innocent man represents the quintessential failure of the justice
system; nevertheless, the fact that there are innocent men on
death row is a symptom of far more widespread problems, such
as ineffective assistance of counsel and inadequate appellate review. The Hollywood films, though fiction, do a far better job at
communicating this basic truth.
I. THEORY AND PRACTICE

There are two reasons one might oppose the death penalty.
One reason is that it is wrong for the state to kill; the other is
that although it is in theory acceptable for the state to execute, it
is wrong in practice. The first of these reasons is absolute and
categorical; the second is conditional.
Similarly, just as there are both conditional and categorical
bases for opposing capital punishment, there are both conditional and categorical bases for favoring it. The categorical argument is typically referred to as retribution; the conditional arguments are grounded in utilitarian considerations. In fact, the
utilitarian argument can take several forms, including general
deterrence, specific deterrence, even eugenics. In any case, because the validity of the utilitarian argument depends on empirical data, it can be disproved, and someone who supports the
death penalty solely on the grounds of utilitarianism might
change his or her mind, in view of the data. On the other hand,
the retributive impulse is simply that: an impulse, a feeling, an
urge one has. The retributive rationale is a moral position that
does not depend for its justification on any fact of the matter.
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One who supports the death penalty for reasons of retribution
essentially maintains that vengeance is a legitimate basis for
state action.
Thus, because both the pro- and anti- forces have available
to them both absolute and conditional forms of argument, the
debate concerning the death penalty can take place at either a
theoretical or a practical level. I therefore want to stress that my
thesis is not that documentaries are practical while Hollywood
films are theoretical (or vice versa). My argument, instead, is
that documentaries are not simply practical, they are misleadingly and narrowly so. The problem of executing innocent men4
is a practical issue, rather than a purely theoretical one, but it is
only one of a myriad of practical issues, and it is more properly
understood as a symptom of a larger problem rather than as a
problem in itself. This point is apprehended by the Hollywood
films, though not by the documentaries. The Hollywood movies,
moreover, illustrate a much greater willingness to grapple with
the theoretical issues, issues that the documentaries studiously
eschew.
A. THEORY

Camus once said that the only serious philosophical question is the question of suicide. In death penalty cases, the only
serious question is homicide: whether the state ought to engage
in it. Every other issue is just a distraction.
I have on my desk a death certificate for a man I represented. There is a space on the certificate where the physician
who declared my client dead was required to indicate the cause
of death. The cause of death is listed as homicide. Unlike the
word murder, which is a technical legal term of art, the word
homicide is simply the sum of its parts: homi from homo, meaning man; cide from cidere, meaning to kill or slay. What a murderer does when he murders is commit homicide; what the state
does when it executes is commit homicide. Both are killing. The
theoretical issue presented by the death penalty is whether the
state ought to commit homicide.
Death penalty movies cheat when they substitute the question "Is it permissible for the state to execute someone who is
innocent?" for the question ''Is it permissible for the state to
4. Because 99 percent of death row inmates are male.;, I generally usc the masculine pronoun when referring to the death row population.
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kill?" Virtually no one feels the urge to execute an innocent
man, but many feel the urge to execute someone who is guilty.
A truthful and honest death penalty film must face that fact.
When family members of a murder victim express a desire to see
the murderer executed, they are expressing a passion which
nearly everyone who has seen a loved one murdered has felt.
The Hollywood films show human beings experiencing this powerful passion; the documentaries do not.
Of course, the state itself does not experience passion. The
state must act on principle. The theoretical question, therefore,
is not whether the state may execute an innocent, but rather
whether there is some principle that supports the state's commission of homicide, notwithstanding the moral proposition that
killing is wrong. This is the very question that the Hollywood
films raise. How is it possible for the state legitimately to carry
out an act that is inherently wrong? The Hollywood movies suggest that there is no satisfactory answer to this question; the
documentaries avoid it altogether.
In this respect, the documentaries mirror society in their
avoidance of complexity. For example, in the typical execution,
we attempt to elide the troubling moral concerns by insisting
that we are actually saving lives by taking one, or by characterizing the execution victim not as a human being but as a rabid
animal. These devices are subterfuges that we employ in an effort to evade the truth. But the truth is a tireless and stubborn
thing. 5 The Hollywood films concede that the retributive impulse is a powerful human emotion, yet they further suggest that
it is an impulse we ought to resist. It is not wrong for human beings to experience the desire for vengeance; it is wrong for the
state to act on it. The documentaries avoid the subject altogether.

5. Sec Ex parte Tucker, 973 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. Cr. App. 1998) (en bane); I discuss
the Tucker case in The Humanity of Karla Faye Tucker, 90:3 The Texas Observer 4 (Feb.
13, 1998), available at <http://www.texasobscrver.org/subjects/cditorials/2.13.98.dd.html>,
and in Tucker's Execution Begs Re~o·amping of Texas System, Houston Chronicle 23 (Feb.
4 1998), available at 1998 WL 3559625. Many proponents of capital punishment urged
mercy in the Tucker case, including, perhaps most famously •. Pat Robertson, who has
since supported a general moratorium on the death penalty owmg to the number of mnocent men who have been sent there. Sec Steven A. Holmes, Look Who's Questioning the
Death Penalty, N.Y. Times, Week in Review 3 (Apr. 16, 2000).
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B. THE PRACTICAL

When it comes to the practical issues, as well, the Hollywood movies are much fuller, and therefore more honest, than
the documentaries. There is a sense, of course, in which the
problem of executing an innocent man is a practical problem,
but the Hollywood movies apprehend that the fact that there are
innocent men on death row is actually a symptom of a larger
problem. The Hollywood films, unlike the documentaries, address these larger problems.
Many opponents of capital punishment feel the retributive
impulse as strongly as the death penalty's most enthusiastic supporters. Yet they are nonetheless against capital punishment.
The reason is simply that whatever might be said about the morality of executions in principle, there is nothing that can be said
in defense of the system of executions that we actually have.
Name a component part of the death penalty apparatuslawyers, judges, juries, police-and you will have named something that is corrupt. This corruption is well known, and many
details of it have been covered elsewhere. 6 Nevertheless, I will
briefly describe three of the most serious defects with the system: inadequate counsel for indigent defendants, racism, and finally, lawlessness and arbitrariness in the courts. I will then argue in Part II that the Hollywood films have managed to capture
all of these defects.
1. Counsel 7

In law, as in life, one gets what one pays for. Calvin Burdine did not have any money to hire counsel when he was accused of capital murder. As a result, the State of Texas was required to appoint one to represent him, because the Sixth
Amendment provides that a criminal defendant has a right to be
represented by counsel. Burdine's lawyer slept through portions
6. The most assiduous chronicler of the unjustness of the current death penalty
apparatus in America-from the arrest stage through ultimate execution-has b<.:en
Stephen B. Bright. Significant articles of his illuminating the present system include

Counsel for the Poor: The Death Semence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst
Lawyer, I 03 Yale L.J. 1835 (1994 ); Is Fairness Irrelevant: The Evisceration of Federal Habeas Corpus Review and Limits on the Ability of State Courts to Protect Fundamelllal
Rights, 54 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. I (1997); Discrimination, Death, and Denial: The Tolerance of Racial Discrimination in Infliction of the Death Penaltv, 35 Santa Clara L. R<.:v.
433 (1995). Sec also Ira R. Robbins, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review
in State Death Penalty Cases, 40 Am. U. L. Rev. I (1990).
7. The discussion of counsd incompetence is based in significant part on cas<.:s of
which I have first-hand knowledge.
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of jury selection as well as through portions of the trial itself.
Members of the jury as well as the trial judge's law clerk saw him
sleeping and subsequently testified under oath as to that fact. A
federal district judge set aside Burdine's conviction and ruled
that he must receive a new trial. 8 (Remarkably, a split panel of
the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that Burdine was required to
show predjudice and that he could do so only by identifying with
specificity the precise moments when counsel was sleeping. See
Burdine v. Johnson, 231 F.3d. 950 (5th Cir. 2000), opinion vacated and rehearing en bane granted by 2000 WL 1785536 (Dec.
5, 2000). The Fifth Circuit has since voted to reconsider the case
en bane. If the entire Fifth Circuit upholds the panel's decision,
it would not be surprising for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari review.)
What is unique about the Burdine case is that the federal
court ruled in his favor. The fact that Burdine was represented
by a sleeping lawyer is not a distinctive feature of his case. 9 It
may not be common for lawyers to sleep during capital murder
trials, but it was common for the particular lawyer who represented Burdine to sleep. In fact, one of the witnesses who testified that the lawyer was sleeping also stated that it was common
knowledge that this lawyer slept during trial proceedings. 10 Yet
he was appointed to represent numerous capital murder defendants. At least a dozen former residents of death row- they are
former residents because they have been executed-were represented by this single lawyer.
Another death row inmate in Texas, a woman named Pam
Perillo, recently prevailed on her legal claim in the Fifth Circuit
because her lawyer, while supposedly representing Perillo, was
also having a close personal relationship with one of the State's
primary witnesses. Moreover, the lawyer appointed to represent
Perillo had previously represented a different defendant in connection with the same crime, and his strategy in that prior defense had been to blame all wrongdoing on Perillo. 11 The precise contours of the conflict of interest present in the Perillo case
are somewhat unusual, but not as unique as one might hope. In

8. Burdine v. Johnson, 66 F. Supp. 2d 854 (S.D. Tex. 1999); sec also Burdine v.
Johnson, 87 F. Supp. 2d 711 (S.D. Tex. 2000).
9. Sec David R. Dow, The State, the Death Penalty, and Carl Johnson, 37 B.C. L.
Rev. 691 (1996). The Carl Johnson case is referred to in the court's order in Burdine, but
Johnson had already been executed, in September 1995.
10. 66 F. Supp. 2d at 857.
II. Perillo v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 775,786 (5th Cir. 2000).
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fact, one capital murder defendant was represented by a lawyer
who was having an affair with the defendant's wife. In the midst
of the trial, the defendant was served with divorce papers, and
following the conviction of the defendant, the lawyer proceeded
to marry the death row inmate's former wife. 12 A defendant
who is facing a death sentence is probably better off being represented by a lawyer who does not have designs on that defendant's wife. A capital murder defendant is also best served by
having a lawyer who has not traded representation for book
rights to the client's story, but the lawyer who represented Betty
Lou Beets, the second woman executed in Texas since Reconstruction, did exactly that. 13
Sexual conflicts of interest are not terribly common, but
conflicts of interest in general are rampant. For example, lawyers appointed to represent indigent capital defendants have, in
order to justify their claim for greater compensation, at times
represented co-defendants- a situation that is ripe with conflict
potential. In one notorious case, a single lawyer represented codefendants even though the excuse of one of the defendants was
that the other one had pulled the trigger and fired the fatal shots.
In another case, a defendant was convicted and sentenced to
death and then prevailed in his appeals and was therefore the
beneficiary of a new trial. At his second trial, he was represented by the man who had served as the foreman of the jury at
the first trial-in other words, he was represented by someone
who had already deemed him guilty and sentenced him to
death. 14 Charles Bass, who was executed in 1986, turned himself
in to authorities after consulting with a lawyer who, unbeknownst to Bass, had entered into a contract with a filmmaker
who was producing a film based on the life of Bass's murder victim; the attorney received $5000 from the film company in advance and a promise of additional cash if Bass in fact surrendered. When Bass argued on appeal that he had not only
received ineffective assistance but had in fact been betrayed by
his lawyer, the court of appeals ruled against him, reasoning that

12. Houston Chronicle Pub. Co. v. McMaster, 598 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. Cr. App. 1980)
(en bane).
13. Sec Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258 (5th Cir. 1995), cc.:rt. denied, 517 U.S. 1157
(1996).
14. Sec Ex-Jury Foreman Defends Afurder Suspect in 3d Trial, N.Y. Times A20
(Nov. 3, 1988}.
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the law(ser who betrayed Bass did not ultimately represent him
at trial. 5
Sometimes the incompetence of lawyers who represent indigent defendants can be attributed to a conflict of interest, but
at other times, it is attributable to nothing other than the sheer
ineptitude of the lawyer. Thus, for example, one defendant was
represented by counsel who, during his closing argument, said,
"You are an extremely intelligent jury. You've got this man's
life in your hands. You can take it or not. That's all I've got to
say." The lawyer then sat down. He was finished with his closing.16 Harvey Duffy was represented by a lawyer who had never
tried a capital case; the lawyer spent less than a day picking the
jury-even though jury selection is perhaps the most critical
phase of a capital murder trial. 17 A handful of defendants have
been represented by lawyers who did not raise even a single objection throughout the course of the trial. 18 One unfortunate defendant was represented by a lawyer who showed up drunk at
the trial, 19 and another defendant, a Hisfanic, had his lawyer refer to him during the trial as a wetback. 2
Lawyers representing capital defendants do not perform
any better on apveal. One appellate lawyer filed a brief that was
one page long. 2 Another lawyer continually failed to meet
deadlines for filing the appellate pleadings and was therefore
jailed for contempt. The lawyer ultimately filed a brief that was
eight pages long, which he wrote from a jail cell. 22 A lawyer in
Alabama filed a brief for a man named Larry Heath that was
one-page long. The lawyer cited a single case-a case that went
against his position. The brief had more typographical errors
than it had citations to authority. And yet, when Heath was finally fortunate enough to obtain competent counsel, all the issues he might have raised on appeal were deemed to have been
defaulted by the previous lawyer? 3
The problem with starting to tell stories about attorney ineptitude is that one can go on telling stories for a long, long time.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
part sub
23.

Bass v. Estelle, 696 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1983).
Romero v. Collins, 884 F.2d 871,875 (5th Cir. 1989).
Ex parte Duffy, 607 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. Cr. App. 1980) (en bane).
Sec, e.g., Ex parte £arvin. 816 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Cr. App. 1991) (en bane).
Russell v. Lynaugh, 892 F.2d 1205, 1213 (5th Cir. 1989).
Ex parte Guzman, 730 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Cr. App. 1987) (en bane).
Sec Bright, 103 Yale L.J. at1835 (cited in note 6).
.
Nichols v. Collins, 802 F. Supp. 66 (S.D. Tex. 1992), aff'd in part and n:v'd m
nom. Nichols v. Scocc, 69 F.3d 1255 (5th Cir. 1995).
Bright,103 Yale L.J. at1860-61 (cited in note 6).
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But I should add one final point, and that is that even when the
lawyers are good-and there are many very fine lawyers appointed to represent indigent capital defendants- they are prevented from mounting a fully effective defense. Two obstacles
stand in their way, one concrete and one somewhat more abstract. The concrete obstacle is that they are paid insufficient
wages. For example, the two lawyers who represented accused
cop-killer Carl Wayne Buntion were awarded $30,000 less than
they had requested. 24 The lawyer who represented Federico
Martinez-Macias was paid at the princely rate of $11.84 per
hour. 25 Once defense lawyers know that their bills will be scrutinized with hyper-zealousness by trial judges who are loathe to
authorize the spending of taxpayer dollars for the representation
of an accused murderer, defense lawyers will stop doing anything
that they think they might not get reimbursed for. Genuinely
competent counsel do whatever must be done to represent their
clients effectively- witness the efforts of Michael Tigar who represented Terry Nichols in the Oklahoma city bombing trial or
any of the members of the O.J. Simpson defense team. Lawyers
who are worried about whether they will get paid do less.
Second, and somewhat more abstractly, in many states, including Texas, the trial lawyers are appointed not by a central
appointing authority, but instead by the trial judge who will preside over the case. This means, obviously, that the lawyer is
serving two masters: the defendant, but also the judge. If the
lawyer offends or alienates the judge, the lawyer will not be receiving any more appointments. The same dilemma confronts
appellate lawyers, who are appointed by judges who sit on the
Court of Appeals. Even lawyers of the firmest moral fiber cannot help but feel the impact of this conflict. Harris County,
where Houston is located, sends more men to death row than
any single state (other than Virginia and, of course, Texas). In
Harris County, there are 22 criminal district court judges with
jurisdiction over capital cases. Of the 22, 16 have received campaign contributions from lawyers who have been appointed to
represent capital defendants since the beginning of 1998. 26 This

24. Sec Rad Sallee, T«·o Bumion Lawyers Threaren To Sue o~w Legal Fees, Cosrs,
Houston Chronicle 20A (Feb. 27, 1991), available at 1991 WL 3905792. Sec l!encrallv
David R. Dow, Teague and Dearh: The lmpacr of Curren/ Rerroacril·irv Do~rrine 0;1
Capiral Defendams, 19 Hastings Const. L.Q. 23, 36 and nn.17~. 179 ( 1991) ·
25. Marrinez-Afacias v. Collins, 979 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir. 1992).
26. These data arc on file with the author. Moreover, of the twenty-two judges.
twenty-one arc former prosecutors.
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cozy relationship may be pleasant for the prosecutors, judges,
and defense counsel, but it does not best serve the interests of
the capital defendant.
Perhaps the most important quality a lawyer representing
capital murder defendants must possess is the willingness to be
loathed. Lawyers who represent terrorists or mass murderers, or
even simple murderers, must be willing to be reviled by the family members of the murder victims, by demagogic politicians, by
the popular media, even by the presiding judges themselves. A
lawyer who must count on having his or her bill paid by a judge
who is accountable to the electorate will almost never be willing
to incur such enmity. The rare lawyer who has such character
will probably be appointed to represent only one fortunate defendant; the next time, the judge will find someone who is more
compliant.
2. Racism
Over 17,000 executions have occurred in the United States.
Of that number, a total of 35 have involved a white murderer
and a black victim. In Texas, the death penalty capital of the
western world, there has never been a white man executed for
the murder of a black person. In 1998, three white men chained
James Byrd, a black man, to the back of their pickup and
dragged him for miles, killing him. Two of the three were sentenced to death. Until they arrived at death row in 1999, there
had never even been a white murderer on Texas' death row
whose victim was black.
These data are hardly unique to Texas. In Georgia, for example, blacks represent 60 percent of all homicide victims, yet 80
percent of those executed are executed for killing a white. In
Kentucky, over 1,000 blacks have been murdered since 1977, but
of the 28 people on death row, not a single one is there for killing a black.
These data have been known for many years. Over a decade ago, a group of researchers, led by David Baldus, examined
more than 2,000 homicides in Georgia and, as part of the examination, analyzed more than 200 different variables: race of victim, race of offender, economic status of victim and offender, details of the crime, etc. They determined that although black
murderers were significantly more likely than white murderers
to be sentenced to death, the truly dramatic variable was the
race of the victim: Murderers of whites were between 4 and 5
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times as likely to be sentenced to death as murderers of blacks.
This essential finding has been replicated in every state in which
the study has been conducted. 27 Nationwide, whites make up
slightly less than half the total number of murder victims, but
more than 80 percent of those executed are executed for killing a
white.Z 8
Not all scholars agree that the race of the accused plays a
significant role in determining which defendants are sentenced
to death; nevertheless, it is fair to say that a broad consensus acknowledge the impact of the race of the victim. 29 Not even the
Supreme Court has denied this fact. Nevertheless, in 1987, in the
case of McCleskey v. Kemp, 30 the Court denied relief to
McCleskey, a black man sent to death row for murdering a white
victim, on the grounds that McCleskey's statistical showing did
not demonstrate that racism had operated in his particular case.
The dissenting Justices complained that the burden the majority
placed on McCleskey could never be met; all any death row inmate can show are statistics. At some point, those statistics must
be permitted to speak for themselves.
As Lon Fuller's hypothetical Justice Keen once put it, there
is such a thing as overexplaining the obvious. 31 The obvious fact
is that America has not solved its race problem, and one domain
that highlights this problem is the realm of criminal justice. Race
is an issue in the capital punishment arena because it is an issue
in America. Any truthful portrait of death row, to be truthful,
must illuminate this inescapable fact, and any supporter of capital punishment must come to grips with it.

27. Sec David C. Baldus. Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the PostFurman Era, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 1638 (1998); John H. Blume, Post-McClcsky Racial Discrimination Claims in Capital Cases, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 1771 (1998); Gen. Gov't Div.,
U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Rep. GGD-90-57, Death Penalty Semencing: Research Indicates Pauem of Racial Disparities (Feb. 26, 1990) (summarizing data from more than 20
studies); Stephen P. Garvey, The Emotional Economy of Capital Semencing, 75 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 26 (2000).
28. Current statistics, as well as links to death penalty sites, both pro and con, can
be found at the website of the Death Pcnaltv Information Center
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org.
·
'
29. Sec. e.g., John C. McAdams, Racial Disparity and the Death Penalty, 61 L. &
Contcmp. Prob. 153 (1998).
30. 481 U.S.279(1987).
31. Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 616
(1949).
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3. Arbitrariness
When the Supreme Court struck down all then-existing
death penalty laws in 1972, it did so in part because the Justices
could make no sense of why some defendants were sentenced to
death and others who had committed identical, if not more heinous, crimes were not. Justice Stewart, in an evocative metaphor, complained that the chances of being sentenced to death
were akin to the likelihood of being struck by lightning. 32 Neither fate is rationally explicable. That type of arbitrariness, the
Court ruled, was inconsistent with due process and the rule of
law.
Immediately following the Court's decision, most states rewrote their death penalty statutes with the goal of reserving the
death penalty for the most horrific crimes and the most brutal
criminals. The past two and a half decades of capital punishment, however, have proven that achieving consistency or rationality is chimerical. Prosecutors retain discretion not to seek
the death penalty even where it is legally warranted, and juries
retain the power not to sentence defendants to death even when
those defendants qualify for the death penalty. 33
In early 1999, Missouri Governor Mel Carnahan commuted
the death sentence of Darrel J. Mease to a sentence of life in
prison following a brief conversation with Pope John Paul II,
who asked Governor Carnahan to show mercy towards Mease.
Mease is a triple-murderer who was convicted in 1988 of killing
Lloyd Lawrence and his wife Frankie, along with their disabled
grandson William. 34 It would take an uncommon measure of
churlishness for a death penalty foe to begrudge Darrell Mease
his victory, but the simple truth is that he got lucky because the
Pope mentioned him by name and Governor Carnahan, for
whatever reason, was moved by the Pope's appeal. Webster's
dictionary defines "arbitrary" as unprincipled or capricious. To
the hundreds of men (and the handful of women) on death row
in America whose names the Pope does not know, that is the
perfect word to describe why they will die even though Mease
will not.

32. Furman v. Georgia,408 U.S. 238 (1lJ72).
33. On the role of prosecutorial discretion, sec Jeffrey C. Pokorak, Probing the
Capital Prosecwor's Perspective: Race of the Discretionary Actors, 83 Cornell L. Rev.
1811 (1lJlJ8).

34. St:e Gustav Niebuhr, Pope's Appeal Saves Killer in Missouri, Portland Oregonian AI (Jan. 2lJ, 19lJlJ). available at 1lJlJlJ WL 5315052.
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If arbitrariness were solely the result of prosecutorial discretion and the behavior of juries, there would be no legal basis to
complain about it. Ironically, however, the single factor most responsible for perpetuating arbitrariness in the carrying out of the
death penalty is the unwillingness of judges to insist that the law
be followed in all cases. Judges at every level, state and federal,
seem to have grown weary of death penalty appeals, with the
consequence that executions proceed apace even in the face of
egregious constitutional violations. Thus, through the mid 1980s,
2 out of every 5 death sentences were set aside on constitutional
grounds; since the late 1980s or early 1990s, the number has
dropped precipitously, and now the perct:ntage of successful
death penalty appeals is in the single digits. 3 )
Two recent pairs of cases from Texas illustrate the problem.
The first involved Troy Farris, who was sentenced to death in
1983 for killing a police officer. In his appeal to the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals (CCA), he complained that the prosecutors
unconstitutionally excluded from the jury a woman who was opposed to the death genalty. Under the Witherspoon line of Supreme Court cases, prosecutors are permitted to exclude a potential juror who says it would be impossible for him or her to
impose the death penalty, but it is not permissible to strike a juror just because he or she is in principle against capital punishment. If the juror swears that she would be able to carry out her
legal duty, she cannot legally be excluded. The sound idea of the
Witherspoon line is that prosecutors cannot be permitted to empanel a jury that is predisposed toward death.
In Farris's case, the court ruled that the exclusion of a certain juror was permissible because she had "vacillated" on the
question of whether she could adhere to her oath. 37 Four years
later, however, Michael Riley raised the same Witherspoon issue
in the CCA, complaining that prosecutors had wrongfully excluded a juror. This time the Texas court realized that it had
previously misapprehended federal law, and the court granted
Riley relief; 38 moreover, the court in Riley expressly overruled its
decision in Farris. 39

35. Sec David R. Dow, America's Death Machine, 10 Crim. L.F. 387 (1999).
36. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968); Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980);
Wainwright v. \Viu, 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
37. Farris v. State, 819 S.W.2d 490 (Tex. Cr. App. 1991) (en bane). The "vacillating
juror" problem is associated with Wainwright v. Wiu.
38. Riley v. State, 889 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. Cr. App. 1994) (en bane).
39. !d. at 299.
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As it turned out, Farris had not yet been executed. So he
went back to court-first state and then federal-and argued
that the CCA had acknowledged that it had been wrong in his
case and that he should therefore obtain the same relief that Riley received. His appeal was rejected, and he was executed in
1998. 40
In 1999, an even more striking inconsistency occurred in
Texas. Two inmates were set to be executed on consecutive
days: Danny Barber was set to die on a Tuesday, and Stan
Faulder was scheduled for execution on Wednesday, the very
next day. Barber's lawyers, believing that they had exhausted
their legal claims, were telling their client goodbye. Faulder's
lawyers, in the meantime, were persuading a federal judge in
Austin that the State's clemency proceedings are constitutionall.X
defective, and the judge therefore granted Faulder a stay. 1
Faulder's lawyers contacted Barber's lawyers and Barber
authorized the identical issue to be raised in his case. He too received a stay from the same federal judge. 42
The State appealed both cases. On Tuesday afternoon the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused to disturb the stay
in Barber's case. Yet the next day, a different panel of judges
from the same court of appeals did dissolve the stay in Faulder's
case. Both inmates had raised the identical legal claim; indeed,
the exact same pleadings were used by both sets of lawyers- all
that differed was the name of the party seeking relief. The court
of appeals added a footnote to its opinion in the Faulder case acknowledging that it was aware that a different group of judges
had, on the previous day, halted an execution on the same
grounds; but the panel did not explain why it was pursuing a different course. 43 (The Supreme Court did eventually stay
Faulder's execution, though the legal basis for its decision remains unclear.)
So Michael Riley obtained relief when his lawyers persuaded the CCA to overrule the decision in Farris, whereas Far40. Sec Farris v. Johnson, 967 F. Supp. 200 (N.D. Tcx 1997), atrd 144 F.3d 50 (5th
Cir.), ccrt. denied, 525 U.S. 1004 (1998).
41. Sec Faulder v. Texas Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 178 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 1999) (recounting procedural history), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1017 (1999).
42. None of the opinions relating to the clemency issue in the Barber litigation is
published. The Supreme Court's denial of relief is located at 525 U.S. 1132 (1999) .. I
have previously criticized the refusal of the courts-both state and federal-to pubhsh
their opinions in death penalty cases. Sec Dow, 37 B.C. L. Rev. at 708 (cited in note 9).
The details in the text arc based on my first-hand knowledge of the cases.
43. The opinion is unpublished; a copy is on file with the author.
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ris was struck by lightning. And Danny Barber, who was alerted
to the existence of a legal issue by Faulder, had his legal victory
upheld on appeal while Faulder's was set aside. (Both Faulder
and Barber have since been executed.) The phrase "death penalty law" might not quite be an oxymoron, but Justice Stewart
would notice no difference between the system we have today
and the regime he condemned 25 years ago. Indeed, it is for this
very reason that Justice Blackmun, who voted in favor of the
state in death penalty cases throughout the 1970s and 1980s, finally announced in 1994 that he would "no longer ... tinker with
the machinery of death." 44
One reason that arbitrariness has become so difficult to
eradicate is that, in the domain of death penalty law, judges have
grown weary of the appellate process. When modern death penalty jurisprudence began to develop in the 1970s, the Supreme
Court assumed that appellate judges would, by examining death
penalty appeals with assiduous care, eliminate arbitrary sentencing.45 For many years, appellate judges did so, with somewhere
between 40 and 60 percent of death sentences being set aside by
federal courts. 46 But along the way, judges somehow grew weary
of these cases. They became more interested in speeding executions along than in scrutinizing proceedings in capital cases. This
weariness has manifested itself in two ways. The first is that
judges will occasionally direct angry exasperation toward lawyers representing condemned men. 47
The second exemplification of this weariness is found in the
systematic narrowing of the universe of claims that death row
inmates are even permitted to bring. For example, the Court has
indicated that a claim of actual innocence is not, standing alone,
a cognizable claim on habeas review. 48 It has held that death
row inmates are not entitled to counsel in order to pursue collateral (i.e., habeas) relief 9 -meaning that the Court has sanctioned the execution of men who, at the time of execution, are

44. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141,1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
45. Sec, e.g.,Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
46. See Dow, 10 Crim. L.F. at 387 (cited in note 35); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S.
I, 24 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting reversal rate in capital post-conviction appeals of 60-70 percent).
47. See, e.g., David R. Dow, Fromiers of Justice, 80 Texas Observer 9-10 (Nov. 25,
1988) (concerning former death row inmate Walter Bell); McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S.
849 (1994).
48. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
49. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989).
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unrepresented by counsel. Justice Scalia has even implied that
lawyers who represent death row inmates in their collateral proceedinSs were "guerillas," bent on subverting the will of the majority.5 What is extraordinary about Justice Scalia's tiradeaside from the fact of the tirade itself-is that he delivered it in a
case in which the death row inmate argued simply that he was
entitled to have the sentencing jury know that he would be ineligible for parole under state law should he be sentenced to life in
prison (rather than death). 51 Seven Justices, all but Scalia and
Thomas, agreed on the result. As Justice Blackmun put it for
the plurality, "The State may not create a false dilemma by advancing generalized arguments regarding the defendant's future
dangerousness while, at the same time, preventing the jury from
learning that the defendant will never be released on parole. " 52
That such a result could prompt Justice Scalia's outburst is stunning. Of course, there has long been a strain of popular opinion
that cares not a whit about constitutional rights if the guilt of the
defendant is not in question. This very attitude is what animates
lynch mobs. When Justices of the Supreme Court direct such
venomous fury against lawyers even in a case in which the death
row inmate prevails by a lopsided vote, they sanction and even
participate in this lynch mob mentality. 53 And when death penalty movies focus on innocence, they let these Justices get away
with it.

*****
The simple and inescapable truth of the matter is that the
death penalty system we have is illegitimate. Indigent defendants commonly receive incompetent lawyers. Competent lawyers are commonly denied resources necessary to mount effective defenses. Trial judges in most states with the death penalty
are elected officials, with the consequence that there is political
pressure on them to ensure that capital defendants are convicted
and sentenced to death. Black defendants are more likely to receive the death sentence, all other things being equal, than white
defendants, and murderers of white victims are more than twice
as likely to be sentenced to death as murderers of nonwhite victims. Appellate judges ignore the law. The death penalty may
50. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 185 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 156.
52. Id.at171.
53. Simmons is not the only case in which Justice Scalia has expressed this antipathy toward death penalty lawyers. See McFarland v. Scali, 512 U.S. 849 (1994) (transcript of oral argument), available at 1994 WL 665012 sub nom. McFarland v. Collins.
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well be illegitimate even in a noncorrupt world, but that is an argument for philosophers because the world we actually have is
one in which the death penalty apparatus is corrupt from head to
toe. This truth is hidden in most documentaries. Ironically,
however, it is a truth that fiction illuminates rather well.
II. FICTIONAL DOCUMENTARIES AND TRUTHFUL
FICTIONS
Let me be clear about one thing at the outset: I am not urging that documentary film-makers and lawyers and journalists
cease their efforts to identify individuals who have been wrongfully convicted; I am suggesting that the recent obsession with
claims of innocence has obscured the fact that innocence is a
symptom of a larger, systemic corruption.
Thus, The Thin Blue Line, a film that led directly to Randall
Dale Adams's release from death row, has nothing to do with
the philosophical issue of the death penalty's moral legitimacy.
Similarly, Fourteen Days in May, which details the final two
weeks of the life of a death row inmate who suffered nearly
every injustice that the capital punishment regime can serve up,
ultimately elects to focus on the inmate's claim of innocence,
thereby blunting the force of, and even obscuring, all else.
Yet to a committed death penalty advocate, executing an
innocent man is simply the cost of doing business, the price of an
imperfect justice system. Few would say that aloud, perhaps but
anyone who supports capital punishment must believe it, for the
evidence of wrongful convictions is simply incontestable. 54
Someone who believes that the death penalty is inherently
wrong cheats by focusing solely on innocent inmates. Worse,
this cheating tends to legitimate the increasingly entrenched legal doctrine that holds that unless an inmate can prove that he
did not actually commit the crime for which he was sentenced,
then virtually any constitutional violation can be overlooked. 55
Surely innocence should matter, but it should not be all that matters. Constitutional values and moral norms are not applicable
only to the wrongly accused.

54.
55.

See Dow, 10 Crim. LF. at 387 (cited in note 35).
Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141 (1998).

530

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 17:511

A. THE PROBLEM OF INNOCENCE.

Death penalty films that focus on innocence are probably
both a cause and a result of the recent public fascination with the
issue of innocence. Yet although public attention to the issue of
innocents being executed has reached new heights, the issue itself is hardly new. Indeed, since Gary Gilmore was executed by
firing squad in Utah in 1977, beginning the modern death penalty era, there have been nearly 13 people released from death
row in America for every 100 killed. Despite this staggering statistic, popular support for the death penalty increased steadily
from the mid 1970s through the late 1980s, and remained at a
high level until the last year or two, when support dropped
somewhat (though not precipitously). 56 Part of this drop may
well be attributable to the surge in attention paid to wrongful
convictions. The most dramatic event to contribute to this focus
on innocence was almost certainly the decision by George Ryan,
the Republican governor of Illinois, to halt executions in his
state. He did so because since the death penalty resumed in Illinois, there have been more men released from death row after
being found innocent than have been executed. Subsequently,
Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont introduced a bill, the Innocence Protection Act of 2000, that would make DNA testing
available to state and federal inmates, regardless of the amount
of time that has transpired since their convictions, 5 7 and a similar
measure has been adopted in the House. 58
Everybody is interested in innocence, in other words. The
problem is that the issue of innocence has all but obscured the
fact that the death penalty system fails, in one sense or another,
in nearly every case. And what is particularly extraordinary
about this turn of events is that the documentaries have contributed to the obfuscation while the Hollywood movies have grappled with the entire range of issues. I will illustrate this claim by
discussing in some detail each of the four principal films.
B. THE MOVIES
The Green Mile
The Green Mile is set in Louisiana during the Depression.
The film is based on a work by Stephen King, and King helped
56.
57.
58.

See Holmes, Look Who's Questioning the Death Penalty at 3 (cited in note 5).
!d.
!d.
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adapt the work for the screen. It stars Tom Hanks, who plays
Paul Edgecomb, the chief guard on death row, and Michael
Clarke Duncan, who plays an inmate named John Coffey.
There are also magnificent performances from Sam Rockwell,
who plays the film's most truly despicable character, a multiple
murdered named William "Wild Bill" Wharton; from Doug
Hutchison, who plays the film's second most despicable character, a malignant prison guard named Percy Wetmore; from
David Morse, who plays Hanks's first assistant, a guard named
Brutus "Brutal" Howell; and from Michael Jeter, who plays a
truly charming death row inmate named Eduard Delacroix.
Coffey is convicted of a double murder. He is black, and he
is huge. With the Herculean Coffey standing next to him, Hanks
looks like a pygmy. We eventually learn that Coffey is not dimwitted, but he seems as if he might be. Coffey speaks slowly and
tentatively, giving the impression of mild retardation or, as he is
characterized by one of the guards, a simpleton. His first words
in the movie are "Yes sir, boss. I can talk." He is a character
who embodies three distinct stereotypes. Initially, he is the fearsome Negro: supernaturally strong and intellectually lame. Then
he transmogrifies into a second stereotype: preternaturally
strong and perfectly meek, the gentle giant. And at last we learn
that Coffey in fact possesses supernatural powers; he becomes
the Jesus figure: a man who, with his touch, can heal illness; a
man who can see into the hearts of his fellow human beings and
know whether they are evil; a man of pure, unadulterated goodness; a man who is killed not because he has done anything
wrong, but because he is feared, because killing him will satisfy
an appetite that will otherwise not be sated.
We do not see any of Coffey's trial, but we do not need to.
Two young white girls were found dead in Coffey's arms. In
Louisiana in the 1930s, that was all the evidence the State
needed. The father of the girls notices them missing, then discovers blood and torn clothing. Fearing the worst, he calls the
sheriff, who assembles a posse. Dozens of men armed with rifles
and shotguns fan out through the Louisiana countryside. At last
the men come upon Coffey, who is sitting with his arms around
the girls, sobbing hysterically, saying over and over that he had
come too late. At the time we do not know what this means; we
later discover that Coffey had been unable to revive the girls,
who had been murdered by Wild Bill. The sheriff stands by for
several moments while the girls' father punches Coffey repeatedly about the head and face. Coffey offers no resistance. The
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scene is Louisiana in the 1930s, and we watch the scene tensely,
knowing that Coffey could easily have been lynched.
Coffey is convicted of abducting and murdering the two
young white girls and sent off to death row. We do not see his
lawyer's performance, but we can be certain that it was worse
than perfunctory, for when we later meet the lawyer, we meet a
man who never believed in his client and had no sympathy for
him or his fate. We meet a lawyer who thinks of his former client as sub-human, as unworthy of a defense. In short, we meet
the typical, southern death penalty lawyer that an indigent defendant would have.
Coffey arrives at the prison and the guards are awestruckliterally mesmerized- by his size. They warn Hanks to be wary,
but Hanks does not fear him. Coffey puts up no resistance, just
as he showed none when he encountered the posse. He steps
into his cell and it is as if he has donned a tee shirt that is several
sizes too small.
In the course of the film, we see a total of four inmates on
death row: Coffey, Wharton, Delacroix, and an Indian named
Arlen Bitterbuck (played by Graham Greene). There does not
appear to be any question as to whether the latter three in fact
committed the crimes for which they were sentenced to die.
Coffey, however, is a different story. He is a Christ-like figure
with mystical, supernatural powers. He caresses a dead mouse in
his huge hands and brings the mouse (Delacroix's pet, who is
named Mr. Jangles), back to life. He heals Hanks' bladder infection by grabbing Hanks' crotch through the iron bars of his cell
and squeezing. He sucks a life threatening brain tumor out of
the head of the warden's wife. He can see into the hearts of
men. When Wild Bill first arrives at death row, Coffey whispers
"be careful," and moments later, Wild Bill attacks the guards.
Towards the end of the film, in the scene immediately preceding the execution, Coffey channels a portion of his power
into Hanks and allows Hanks to see into the past: to see that
Wild Bill committed the double murder for which Coffey was
sentenced to death. Hanks knows that he will be executing an
innocent man, and he asks Coffey whether he wants him to foster an escape. Coffey demurs. Hanks is pulled between justice
and order, and, in the end, he embraces order.
Virtually every disgraceful dimension of the modern death
penalty regime makes an appearance in this film. Coffey is convicted because he is a black man and the victims are young white
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girls. Coffey's own lawyer compares Coffey to a rabid dog, saying that the only thing to do with him is to kill him. Most of the
death row guards are amiable, though one is a malignant sadist.
Like the documentaries, The Green Mile does have a central
character who is innocent, but the difference between this film
and either of the documentaries is that we know that Coffey
ended up on death row because his lawyers were inept and because racism is a potent force. We see an innocent man die, but
it is not all we see. We see how the execution of an innocent is a
result of a myriad of lesser evils.
Coffey's jailers know beyond any doubt that Coffey is innocent. Yet they carry out the execution anyway, in a tensionfilled death chamber where one of the many witnesses, the father of the two murdered little girls, shouts "kill him twice."
Hanks cannot bring himself to order the executioner to throw
the switch. God will want to know how Hanks could have killed
one of His miracles, and what will Hanks say? That he was just
doing his job? And yet, though he must be prodded by his assistant to give the order to carry out the execution, in the end
Hanks does so. He shuffles over to Coffey and clandestinely
shakes his hand. Then he gives the order, and Coffey is electrocuted.
Fourteen Days in May

Gary Gilmore and Harold Lane are the answers to trivia
questions: Gilmore, of course, was the first person executed in
America following the reinstatement of the death penalty by the
Supreme Court in 1976. Lane was the one-hundredth execution
victim in the belt buckle of the death belt, the State of Texas.
Edward Earl Johnson has no trivia question associated with his
death. Were it not for a single accident, he would be all but forgotten, for he was the second person executed in Mississippi following resumption of the death penalty (and the seventy-third
nationwide). Instead, however, Johnson's memory survives because the BBC commissioned a documentary about the last two
weeks of his life at the Parchman Farm, in the Yazoo Delta in
Sunflower County, Mississippi.
In 1979 in a rural Mississippi town, an elderly woman
named Sally Franklin was attacked in the boarding house she
operated. One of her boarders heard the commotion and called
the police. J.T. Trest, the town marshall, responded to the call.
Trest was shot first with a small caliber pistol and then with his
own gun. One witness believed that he had seen a Buick speed-
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ing away from the scene. Edward Earl Johnson was arrested because he owned a Buick.
From the outset Johnson denied any involvement in the
crime and said he had been at a bar when the crime occurred.
No physical evidence connected Johnson to the crime. Franklin,
the female victim of the assault, had known Johnson all his life,
and when Johnson was arrested, she said he was not the criminal. The attacker, she said, was heavyset and bearded. Johnson
was lean and without facial hair. He was eighteen years old at
the time. After being questioned, Johnson was released.
Several weeks later, however, with the case still unsolved,
Johnson was arrested again. He continued to protest his innocence. Asked whether he would take a polygraph, he agreed to
do so. As he was being driven by Mississippi troopers to Jackson, Mississippi, where the test was to be administered, Johnson
confessed to the murder.
He subsequently recanted and insisted that he had been coerced. Johnson's story was that the troopers had told him that
he would confess or they would shoot him and say that they had
done so as he tried to escape. Johnson said that the troopers
asked him, "Who is going to be around to contradict us, to say
that is didn't happen the way we said?" None of the troopers
makes an appearance in the film. In any case, although no
physical evidence corroborated Johnson's guilt, neither did any
physical evidence exonerate him. He was executed on May 20,
1987, in the Mississippi gas chamber. The warden announced
that he had lost consciousness within one minute after the cyanide hit the acid. The doctor announced that cardiac arrest, the
proximate cause of death, did not occur until twelve minutes had
gone by.
FDM is mostly about Edward Johnson, but not exclusively.
It is also about his family, and about the officials at the Parchman Farm who must carry out the execution. In this respect,
though not as real as The Green Mile, it is substantially fuller
than The Thin Blue Line, a film in which we meet no prison officials and no members of the death row inmate's family. In
FDM, we meet Johnson's mother, his uncle, and his nieces who,
in one excruciating scene, sing him songs that their church choir
has been practicing. We meet his lawyer, Clive Stafford Smith,
and see Smith move back and forth between comforting Johnson
and pursuing last-minute appeals. We see Johnson sitting with
his family when the Supreme Court rejects his final appeal,
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hours before his execution. We see him eating his final meal.
We see him, in short, as a human being, as someone who loves
and is loved.
We also meet the prison personnel who know Johnson and
who are charged with carrying out the execution. The prison
warden, Donald Cabana, is a larger than life figure. He is a
Vietnam veteran who, upon his return from the war, began a career in law enforcement that has taken him to the top position in
the Mississippi criminal justice system. He is interviewed several
times, and after being asked whether he supports the death penalty, Cabana pauses and then "gives a qualified yes. " 59 The camera follows Cabana around the prison as he tends to details of
the execution. We see him preside, for example, over several
meetings at which he insists that his staff conduct themselves
with decorum; he tells members of his staff that he worries about
people who are eager to stand in line to kill someone; we hear
Cabana say that he will terminate any guard who fails to comport himself with appropriate gravity. We see him making sure
that Johnson has a comfortable place to lie down in the holding
cell adjacent to the execution chamber. We see him asking
Johnson what he wants for his final meal. We watch him as he
tells Johnson what the final twenty-two minutes of his life will
consist of.
In one especially unusual scene, we see Cabana and his assistants as they test the functionality of the Mississippi gas chamber, which, at the time of Johnson's execution had not been used
in a number of years. To check its operation, a cage with arabbit is placed on the chair to which the execution victim will be
strapped, and cyanide pellets are dropped into acid. The rabbit
twitches violently, hurling itself about its cage, before expiring.
(An edited version of the film was shown on HBO in the early
1990s. Not a single person called the station to complain about
the execution of Edward Johnson, but several dozen called to
complain about the killing of the rabbit.)
The documentary, for all its balance, nevertheless fails to
focus on the real problems that Johnson's execution exemplifies.
Two-thirds of the death row population in Mississippi are poor,
uneducated, black males. These inmates lack the resources to
hire competent counsel. The lawyer who represented Johnson at
59. Cabana has sine~ chang~d his mind and has written a hook in which he expresses his opposition to capital punishment. Sec Donald A. Cabana, Death at Midnight:
The Confessions of an Execwioner (Northwestern U. Press, 1996).
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trial made no effort to locate the alibi witness. When Johnson
finally obtained zealous and competent lawyers to pursue his
collateral appeals, it was too late. The Mississippi Supreme
Court determined that it would not address the merits of Johnson's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel because it was
waived by not having been raised previously. In all, of the ten
claims that Johnson's lawyers presented, including a claim of a
coerced confession, nine of the claims were di~osed of on procedural grounds, without examining the merits.
One of the insidious canards in death penalty law, perpetuated not only by members of the media, who might not know
better, but also by federal judges, who surely must, is that death
row inmates receive an inordinate number of appeals. What is
meant by that criticism is that judges review the merits of a death
row inmate's claims time and time again. The truth, of course, is
quite different. Most appeals are disposed of as was Johnson's:
on procedural grounds, where the court never reaches the merits
of the claim. Because trial lawyers appointed to represent indigent defendants are typically marginal, the result is that most of
a defendant's cogent constitutional claims are procedurally defaulted as a consequence of the original lawyer's ineptitude;
there is simply nothing that the subsequent lawyer can do. Edward Earl Johnson was executed despite having had no merits
review of the principal issues on his appeal. This fact, however,
cannot be gleaned from the film; the only way to learn it is to
read the reported decision. 61
Instead, the film waters down even its strengths by its
treatment of innocence. Johnson always claimed that he had an
alibi. Several prison guards are interviewed, and one of them
says that he as well as several others believe that Johnson is innocent. Warden Cabana, on the other hand, although his tone
lacks conviction, does say that he thinks Johnson did the crime.
(He also says that although Johnson might deserve to die, he
does not deserve to be first in line; he should be about number
15 or 16, in Cabana's estimation.) After Johnson's execution is
confirmed, we learn that his lawyers subsequently located the
witness who could have supported Johnson's alibi: a woman he
had met in a pool hall. She reportedly claims that she went to
police when Johnson was arrested to tell them that Johnson
could not be the guy, but, she says, she was instructed to go
60.
61.

Johnson v. Srare, 508 So. 2d 1126,1127-28 (Miss. 1987).
!d.
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home and mind her business. Unfortunately, this information is
communicated by subtitle, just before the film's credits roll. We
never see the woman or hear her voice. Not only, then, is the
exculpatory evidence not truly shown to us, but the strongest
evidence of innocence- the only evidence that does not come
directly from either Johnson or his lawyers-is thrown at us literally as the film is ending, thereby coloring everything that has
come before with the overlay of innocence.
The Thin Blue Line
Randall Dale Adams may have been released from death
row even had this film never been made, but he might also have
been executed. Adams spent twelve years on death row after
being convicted by a Dallas jury of the murder of Robert Wood,
a Dallas police officer.
From the moment of his arrest, Adams denied any involvement in the crime, and his story remained consistent and constant in every detail. He said that he had recently moved to Dallas to look for work, and had managed to find it. One night, on
Thanksgiving weekend, he had run out of gas on the highway
and pulled over to the side of the road. He was picked up by a
young man named David Harris, whom Adams had never before
met. Harris told Adams that he was out of work and was basically just passing through town. Adams, grateful for the assistance, told Harris that he should stay in Dallas and look for work
at the place where Adams worked as a laborer. The two men
got something to eat and went to see a drive-in movie, but Adams was not interested in it and asked Harris drive him back to
his hotel, where he was staying with his brother. According to
Adams, he was back at his hotel before ten o'clock and was
asleep before eleven.
Shortly after midnight, Officer Wood and his partner noticed a car without its headlights on. Wood turned on his patrol
car's flashing lights and signaled the car to pull over. As Wood
approached the driver's window, the car's occupant fired five
shots, all of which struck Officer Wood, who bled to death on
the side of the road.
When police get shot on the job in Texas, and indeed in any
state, no expense is spared in pursuing their killers. FDM, which
also involves the murder of a peace officer, does not emphasize
this salient fact; TBL does. Investigatory zealousness is not necessarily a bad thing, but it can become so, when zeal outpaces
judgment. Fifty investigators began an intense search for
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Wood's killer. Unfortunately, several weeks and hundreds of
man-hours were squandered because Wood's partner had told
investigators that the car that had been pulled over was a blue
Chevy Vega. In fact, the car had been a Mercury Comet. Police
and other law enforcement officials tracked down virtually every
blue Vega in the State of Texas looking for a bullet-riddled vehicle. This investigative feat was an impressive achievement, but
one that had only a negative impact on the investigation, because it meant that officers were not pursuing leads that had a
chance of proving relevant.
Aside from her mistaken description of the vehicle, Wood's
partner also told investigators, originally, that the car that had
been pulled over had only a single occupant. She said that the
car's single occupant had been wearing some type of jacket with
a fur collar. Only later did she say that there might have been
two occupants after all. David Harris turned out to have been
wearing that night a parka with a fur collar. Adams remembered
this detail, and Harris's parka was later recovered. Randall Adams's only jacket, the one he wore that evening, was made of
blue denim.
In December, with Officer Wood's murder still unsolved,
Harris was arrested for stealing a car in Vidor, Texas. Harris
was well-known to local law enforcement authorities, and in the
preceding weeks, he had been boasting to local residents about
having shot a policeman in Dallas. Following his arrest for
automobile theft, however, Harris said that he hadn't killed the
Dallas officer after all but knew who had. At the time, Harris
was ineligible for the death penalty because he was only sixteen.
Adams was twenty-eight. The film implies that authorities were
pleased to have a suspect they could lawfully execute. Adams
was arrested on December 21st.
Adams was not a career criminal. In fact, at the time he was
tried for the murder of Officer Wood, Adams had never been
convicted of, or even charged with, any crime. There was not a
jot of physical evidence to connect him to the murder. There
was not the faintest hint of a motive. Indeed, the evidence
against Adams was remarkably thin: testimony from a rewardseeking, attention-hungry, unemployed mother; and testimony
from a sixteen-year-old career criminal. In exchange for providing this damning testimony, Harris, who was ineligible for the
death penalty due to his age, was not charged with anything-:and charges pending against him in another state were mystenously dropped.
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In many respects Adams's case is unremarkable and just
like Edward Johnson's case, but in one important regard Adams's case was quite unusual and radically different from Johnson's: Adams had competent trial counsel. His lawyers believed
in him and fought aggressively. They were confident they would
secure an acquittal, but they made two mistakes: first, they overestimated the importance of a lack of evidence in a case where a
police officer has been killed, and second, they underestimated
the persuasive effectiveness of David Harris's magnetic charm.
The one witness who supported Harris's story was Emily
Miller, a woman who had been recently fired from her job as a
gas station cashier for stealing. Miller testified that she had seen
a bushy-haired man shoot Officer Wood as she sat in the passenger seat of a car that her husband was driving past the spot on
the highway where the shooting occurred. Miller's husband, the
driver, was black. Unlike his wife, he testified that he had seen
nothing. Although Miller's husband was unable to verify his
wife's story, Miller had an explanation for that: "Black people,"
she said, "they don't like getting involved." (It's hard to say
whether her being married to a black man makes that statement
less or more offensive.) Miller herself had come to the attention
of the Dallas police after she was arrested for disorderly conduct
and taken to the police station for booking. While there she
volunteered that she knew something about the Wood murder.
The disorderly conduct charge was dismissed, as were pending
robbery charges against Miller's daughter.
In Texas, capital trials proceed in two phases. 62 In the first,
the jury determines whether the accused is guilty of the offense:
in Adams's case, the intentional murder of a police officer. The
jury found him guilty on May 4th. The second stage is the punishment phase. By answering so-called special issues, the jury
determines whether the defendant should be sentenced to life or
death. At the time of Adams's trial, the jury was asked to answer two questions: first, whether he had acted deliberately; and
second, whether he would pose a reasonable probability of being
d_ang~rous in the future. \following the ~upreme Court's decisiOn m Penry v. Lynaugh, the Texas legislature added a third
question: if the jury answers the deliberateness and future danger questions in the affirmative, it must then consider whether,

62.
63.

Tex. Code Crim. Proc.
492 U.S. 302 (1989).

~

37.071 (2000).
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in view of all the mitigating evidence proffered by the defendant,
he should be sentenced to life rather than death. )64
The first question is nearly always answered in the affirmative because the jury has, in effect, already answered it at the
guilt-innocence phase of the trial by concluding that the defendant acted intentionally. In modern death penalty litigation, the
critical question is probably the third one, but when Adams was
tried, the critical question was the second. If the defendant
could show that he would not be dangerous in the future, then
the jury would answer the second question in the negative, and
the sentence would be life rather than death.
In order to persuade a jury to return a "yes" answer to the
future dangerousness question, Texas prosecutors (as prosecutors elsewhere) introduce so-called expert psychiatric testimony.
In Adams's case, the devastating testimony came from one Dr.
James Grigson, a man who, it is fair to say, is a discredited charlatan. His behavior in the Adams case was typical of his modus
operandi: he spent fifteen or twenty minutes interviewing Adams, a man to whom he had never before spoken. He then testified for more than two and one-half hours, asserting that Adams
was a psychopath and would undoubtedly kill again. (The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals (the highest state court for criminal
matters) has noted that Grigson is always one hundred percent
certain of his opinion that the defendant against whom he is testifying will kill again.) 65 One thing Grigson is is certain; the
other thing he is is persuasive. The jury sentenced Adams to
death. 66
Adams, who has long since been released from prison, has
not killed again, or, for that matter, committed any crime at all.
But if he had been executed, there would have been no way to
say that Grigson was wrong. Indeed, one of the difficulties with
disproving Grigson's claims is that he has been so effective a
witness. Juries believed him and therefore sentenced everyone
against whom he testified to death, making it difficult to establish that had the accused not been sentenced to death, no harm
would have come about.
When the Supreme Court set aside the Texas death penalty
m 1972, 67 however, one consequence was that many people
64.
65.
66.
67.

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. § 37.071.
Fuller~·. State, 829 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Cr. App. 1992) (en bane).
Adams v. Stare, 577 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. Cr. App. 1979) (en bane).
Branch v. Texas was the companion case from Texas when the Court held, in
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against whom Grigson had testified had their death sentences
transformed into life sentences, and many such inmates were
subsequently paroled, providing a number of murderers each of
whom, according to Grigson, would kill again if ever released.
In the late 1980s, an assistant Dallas area district attorney instructed an investigator to track down the paroled murderers
against whom Grigson had testified to see what had become of
them. Most were living law-abiding lives; none had committed
additional homicides, though one had committed a robbery;
those that had never been released from prison were leading
model inmate lives: following official orders and behaving peacefully. In other words, there is no empirical evidence of Grigson's
predictions ever coming true, but substantial evidence of their
not.
People often wonder how it is possible for so many innocent
men to be sent to prison at all, much less death row. Adams's
case provides a typical answer: first, there is a murder that the
police desperately want to solve. A man (in Adams's case, a
boy, really) who himself risks a long term in prison sees an opportunity to trade a lie for freedom. An unemployed woman
with a daughter facing prison sees an opportunity to cash in on
reward money while also getting charges against her daughter
dismissed. Police and prosecutors see an opportunity to prosecute someone who is eligible for the death penalty instead of a
juvenile, who is not. A quack physician for pathological reasons
of his own persuades an ingenuous group of jurors that a man
with no history of violence is a disaster waiting to happen. And
last of all, prosecutors stack the jury with people disposed toward the death penalty. All these details of the death penalty
regime are present in nearly all cases, but TBL does not emphasize them because it instead focuses with relentless singlemindedness on Adams's innocence.
Almost everything that happened in the Adams trial, as offensive to notions of justice as the trial may have been, was legal.
Almost everything-but not quite. The state in a death penalty
case is not permitted to stack the jury. In Witherspoon v. Illinois,68 the Supreme Court held that a state could not remove for
cause a potential juror just because that potential juror expressed moral qualms with the death penalty. Even such a juror,

Furman v. Georgia, that the death penalty. as then applied, was unconstitutional. 408
U.S. 238 (1972)
68. 391 us s1o (!9oS).
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the Court held, must be permitted to serve on the jury if he or
she could swear an ability to obey the oath that jurors take to
uphold and enforce the law, as instructed by the trial judge. Any
other rule, the Court reasoned, would create a death-qualified
jury, one predisposed toward death.
A decade after Witherspoon, Texas prosecutors were still
violating it. 69 In Adams's case, prosecutors, in accordance with a
then-extant statute, excluded jurors who were unable to swear
that the ~otential death sentence would not "affect" their deliberations. ° Following his defeat in the Court of Criminal Appeals, Adams, through his lawyers, appealed to the Supreme
Court of the United States, arguing principally that this Texas
practice violated the rule of Witherspoon by creating a jury predisposed toward death. The Supreme Court, by a vote of eight
to one, with only then-Justice Rehnquist dissenting, agreed. 71
After twelve years on death row, Adams had his death sentence
set aside.
Following the Supreme Court's decision, Adams's lawyers
went back to the state courts, to try to win his release. However,
in the interim, Governor Bill Clements had commuted Adams's
death sentence into a life sentence, so the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that Adams should not be released from
prison, because the only thing the Supreme Court had held was
that the death sentence itself was unlawful; it had not set aside
Adams's conviction. 72 Adams had won in the Supreme Court,
but the State of Texas still refused to allow him to go free.
In the meantime, David Harris had not reformed. This fact
should not have been a surprise. He had served time in a military stockade, as well as in correctional facilities in Texas and
California. His lengthy criminal record included violent assault
and armed robbery. At last he broke into a couple's home and
attempted to abduct the girlfriend of Mark Mays. When Mays
retrieved his own gun and tried to protect himself and his girlfriend, Harris shot him to death. Harris was arrested, convicted
of capital murder, and sentenced to death.
Errol Morris did not begin filming The Thin Blue Line until
Harris was on death row himself. In the final interview with
Harris, Harris is asked "What do you think about whether or not
69.
70.
71.
72.

Sec supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text (discussing Farris and Riley).
Tex. Penal Code§ 12.31 (1973) (repealed).
Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
Adams~·. Stale, 624 S.W.2d 568 (1981) (en bane).
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[Adams] is innocent?" "I'm sure he is," Harris answers. "How
can you be sure?" asks the interviewer, and Harris replies,
'"Cause I'm the one that knows."
Finally, in the late 1980s, following the release of The Thin
Blue Line, Adams's lawyers commenced state habeas corpus
proceedings. The Court of Criminal Appeals eventually ordered
a new trial. 73 Adams was ordered released from prison. The
State of Texas elected not to retry him, and Adams was at last a
free man.
Dead Man Walking

The title of the movie comes from the book of the same
name, written by Helen Prejean, a nun who has ministered to
death row inmates in Louisiana for more than ten years. 74 Although Prejean's book is nonfiction, the murderous character in
the movie, Matthew Poncelet, is not a particular person; he is instead a composite of a number of different murderers, not all of
whom are in Prejean's book. 75
At one level, the movie is, as it must have been, about Sister
Helen Prejean. Prejean, played by Susan Sarandon, is a woman
from an affluent Louisiana family who lives in the Saint Thomas
projects, an inner city neighborhood where she stands out, even
though she does not wear a habit, because she is white. The
other women who work with her at the Hope House, where
Helen teaches adults to read, warn her against her visit to death
row; "they're all con men," she's told. Prejean opposes the
death penalty not because Catholic doctrine requires such opposition, but because she believes that executions erode the dignity
of the executioner.
At another level the movie is about a murderer and his family. In a brilliant performance, Sean Penn plays Matthew Poncelet, a hate-filled, recidivistic, thoroughly unappealing character.
During his first meeting with Prejean, Poncelet chastises her for
living in a neighborhood where "every nigger carr[ies] a gun."
Later, after a night when two black men were executed, Poncelet

73. Ex parte Adams, 768 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. Cr. App. 1989) (en bane).
74. Prejean, Dead Man Walking (cited in note 2).
75. In one striking indication that Robbins has done his homework, he has Poncelet
order shrimp for his last meal, and Ponct.:let says that he wants them because he has
never eaten them before. It is hard to imagine that anyone with teeth in Louisiana hasn't
eaten shrimp, but Robbins got this detail from Fourteen Days in May. For his final meal,
Edward Earl Johnson orders shrimp, telling Warden Cabana that he has never had them
before.
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says that he hopes prison officials clean the gurney before executing him.
Her colleagues worry that Prejean will be snookered-and I
have seen more than a few sophisticated lawyers conned by
murderers on death row- but Prejean is not. She is portrayed as
a woman of wide-eyed realism. "I'm not sure I want to run into
this guy on the street," she tells her housemates. Yet she also
believes deeply in the power of reason, in the ability of human
beings to educate one another, and in the power of education to
eradicate much evil. Following one of Poncelet's racist tirades,
for example, Prejean says to him, "Was your daddy a racist?"
Poncelet stops his rant on a dime. Prejean engages him, gets him
to express his admiration for Martin Luther King, Jr. Poncelet
respected Reverend King, we learn, "because he wasn't lazy,"
and Prejean tells him that what he hates is laziness, not black
people.
This romantic notion that education and reason will overcome prejudice and hate, that even the basest, least educated
among us can be taught that we are all brothers and sisters, may
be ingenuous, but then again, perhaps it is not. 76 For whatever
other adjective one might use to characterize Prejean, she cannot
fairly be called naive. One evening one of her housemates asks
Prejean what has drawn her to the Poncelet case, and Prejean
says, "I feel caught rather than drawn" -a characterization that
contrasts starkly with Prejean's earlier recollection of being
"drawn" to a life as a nun: one journey was attractive to her; the
other was merely irresistible. What is more, this same dynamic
aptly characterizes the career arcs of many death penalty lawyers; it is not an attraction to murderers that leads them to this
highly specialized area of practice where economic rewards are
few and lawyers often become pariahs in their own neighborhoods, but rather an inability to resist a calling. 77 When judges
and politicians accuse death penalty lawyers of preferring criminals to victims, in other words, they are not even close to the
truth. The death penalty lawyers I know do what they do because, like Prejean, they are drawn; they feel irresistibly called
upon to protect the rights of those who have neither allies nor

76. The sanguine message is the same, for example, in American History X, where a
skinhead goes to prison for murder and emerges years latcr a changed man.
77. Sec, e.g., Austin Sarat, Narrative Strategy and Death Penalty Advocacy, 31 Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 353 (1996); James M. Doyle, The Lawyer's Art: "Representation" in
Capital Cases, 8 Yale J.L. & Hum. 417 (1996).
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resources, to safeguard rights of those who have no ability to
fend for themselves.
Of course, one consequence of representing murderers is
that lawyers drawn to such a practice will often have clients who,
if not themselves irredeemable, have nonetheless committed unforgivable deeds. So too with Poncelet. For much of the length
of the movie, his most (and, in truth, only) redeeming quality is
that he loves his family, and they him. It takes courage to show
that even a vile character can love and be loved, but this film
does that. Moreover, this aspect of the film is yet another measure of the film's honesty, for the truth is that Poncelet's relationship with his family is common for an inmate on death row. One
of the jarring sights one encounters when visiting death row is
the sight of murderers' wives and children, mothers and aunts,
who have come to visit. Also common is that the warm relationship Poncelet has with his family does not extend to his father,
who abandoned Poncelet's family many years before-though
not before he had taken young Matthew into a bar when Matthew was but twelve years old so as to teach him how to drink. It
is true that most men on death row have either bad relationships
or no relationships with their fathers; it is true that most men on
death row grew up with no father at all or with one who was
abusive. All this is true. But Poncelet does not blame his father
for his crime, and Prejean's colleagues remind her that many
kids without fathers do not become criminals.
Again and again this film's message is that any platitude is
false, and any easy answer is mistaken. This is the film's core
quality: its subtle truthfulness. And it is in this respect more
than any other that this film is different from most abolitionist
arguments, and strikingly different from most death penalty advocacy. For most of the voices in the death penalty debate are
shading the truth, usually intentionally. Most of the voices lie or
cheat, because they believe that doing so furthers a desirable
end. Nowhere is this shameful characteristic more prominent
than in opinions of the Supreme Court. Thus, when the Supreme Court includes details of a murder in an opinion that
deals, for example, with the question of whether a constitutional
rule constitutes a "new rule" for purposes of determining its retroactive application, 78 the recital of those details is entirely gratuitous. The purpose played by such a recital is to provoke the
78.
(1997).

Sec Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989); Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 51/l
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reader's visceral outrage at the crime, and to make the reader
entirely unsympathetic to the murderer-so unsympathetic that
the reader does not care about the violation of a constitutional
norm (if he or she even notices the violation).
Just as it is dishonest of the Supreme Court to include
graphic details of a crime that are not germane to the dispositive
legal issue, it is similarly dishonest for death penalty opponents
to ignore the horrific crimes that most residents of death row
have committed. A death penalty proponent who believes that
the death penalty is an ethical form of punishment must address
the fact that innocents will be executed; a death penalty foe must
address the fact that most residents of death row did what they
were convicted of doing and their crimes evoke in many reasonable people an impulse for vengeance that can be quieted only
by an execution. When a death penalty opponent ignores the
murderer's victims and the anguish of the victim's family and
loved ones, the opponent is attempting to evade a fact that ought
not- and cannot- be ignored. Facts are stubborn things for all
the disputants, not just capital punishment supporters.
Dead Men Walking confronts, rather then evades, these disturbing facts. When they were killed, Hope Percy and her boyfriend Walter de la Croix were high school seniors. One cool
Louisiana evening, while Percy and de la Croix were necking in
de la Croix's car, Matthew Poncelet and an older fellow named
Vitello were getting drunk. The two of them drove into the forest and stumbled onto Percy and de la Croix. In turn they raped
Percy, and as Vitello killed her by stabbing her seventeen times,
Poncelet shot de la Croix with a rifle in the back of the head,
killing him. The bodies of the two teenagers were not found until six days later. Percy and de la Croix suffered terror and unimaginable physical pain, and the film presents it all. Poncelet's
crime is a vicious one, and anyone who does not feel an urge for
vengeance as the scenes of the crime are played over and over
again is not, I think, emotionally sincere.
Up until twenty minutes before his execution, Poncelet continues to deny having committed a murder. He will admit only
to having been present. Here DMW has the chance to cheat. It
can saddle Vitello with both murders. Poncelet would not be innocent, in any cosmic sense, but neither would he be a murderer. Yet the film does not take this out. As Ponce let unconvincingly denies having pulled the trigger, DMW shows the rapemurder scene over and over. The movie itself is in color, but the
flash-backs to the crime are in grainy black-and-white, a tech-
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nique that has the effect of stripping everything down, whittling
away all that is extraneous and irrelevant so that what we are left
with is a terrifying, and terrifyingly simple, brutal act of savagery. Hilton Barber, who agrees at Prejean's entreaty to handle
Poncelet's appeal, says early on in the movie that "it's easy to
kill a monster but ... hard to kill a human being" -a point so irrefragably true that the strategy of DMW is to make it not at all
obvious which side of that line Poncelet falls on.
The fundamental moral strategy of death penalty advocates
is precisely to characterize murderers as less than human. In recent years, the single execution in America that has been nationally newsworthy was the execution of Karla Faye Tucker in
Texas-not because her crime was less or more horrific than
Matthew Poncelet's, for it was not, but simply because she had a
handful of characteristics that forced even committed death penalty proponents to confront her humanity. 79 At one point Poncelet, disgusted with the moral righteousness of Prejean, says to
her, "Why should I respect you? Because you got that cross
around your neck?" No, says Prejean, you should respect me
"because I am a person." Prejean, who has spent hours with
Poncelet, cannot help but see him as a person. Death penalty
lawyers, who spend time with their clients and meet their clients'
families, cannot help but see them as human beings, even as
prosecutors and pandering politicians insist on saying that those
on death row are animals. Yet every now and then, a murderer
like Karla Faye Tucker pierces the pretense. The singular difference between Tucker and Poncelet is not that Poncelet is inhuman; it is that, unlike Tucker, he was not able to project his
humanity to those who did not know him.
The salient moral divide is the line we have constructed between persons and wild animals. In D MW we see Prejean forge
a connection, a human connection, with Poncelet: a man who
committed an animalistic act, a man who expresses admiration
for Hitler and doubts that six million Jews were killed. Poncelet
is not likable, and that is the point. Karla Faye Tucker found a
sympathizer in Pat Robertson because she was likable. 80 Poncelet, like everyone, has some good qualities, but no aptitude for
projecting them. Even in the very end, when he finally admits

79. Sec Dow, The Humanity of Karla Faye Tucker, 90:3 Texas Observer (cited in
note 5).
. 80. ld. More recently, Robertson has endorsed the call for a death penalty moratonum, because of the risk of executing an innocent. See supra note 5.
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his guilt and is suffused with remorse, he is still not likable. So
how does Prejean forge with him a human connection? What
special power does she have that allows her to see him as a human being? Is this a skill given only to those possessed of religious faith-and therefore a skill that is as foreign to those of us
without such faith as the ability to run a four-minute mile? Not
according to Prejean. "It's not faith that heals hate," she says,
"it's a lot of work." This is the lesson Tim Robbins has learned
from Prejean's book, and the message that drives this film.
DMW is, I think, an anti-death penalty film. It mocks the
protestors who celebrate executions. It portrays the prison chaplain (a man who cites the Old Testament in support of the death
penalty with not the slightest understanding of the Hebrew bible's nuanced and equivocal approach to this ultimate punishment)81 as a buffoon. It derides the Governor who grotesquely
uses executions as a political tool (as so many recent Presidents
and presidential candidates have done). It portrays prison
guards and the prison doctor and even the warden himself as
men who avoid having qualms about what they are doing by
avoiding giving any thought to what they are doing. "It's just
part of the job, you know," the doctor says, a sentiment shared
by the guard who straps execution victims to the gurney. These
men- the doctor, the guards, even the warden himself- are
surely not the moral equivalent of an Eichmann or a Calley, yet
they are their distant moral cousins. These men in Angola do
not kill as many, and those whom they do execute can hardly be
portrayed as innocent. Yet they do act, and they consciously refuse to confront the morality of their actions. It is precisely in
such refusals that most all ordinary evil begins.
DMW has a point of view, but it is a point of view that
whispers rather than shouts. Except for the chaplain and the
governor (easy targets), the film is respectful to every character
and every point of view. Part of DMW's strategy, it seems, is to
break down the simplistic dichotomies and hackneyed stereotypes. Hope's father says to Prejean, "You can't befriend that
murderer and expect to be our friend, too," and he is probably
right about that because he has characterized Prejean as a
"friend" of the murderer, and victims' families tend to see death
penalty lawyers in exactly that light. But it is the wrong light.

81 On this nuance and ambivalence, sec David R. Dow, The Dearh of Fairness
Counsel Competency and Due Process in Death Penalty Cases, 31 Houston L. Rev. 1105,
1114 (1994).
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One does not need to like Poncelet- one need not be his
friend-to think he should not be executed. That is why Poncelet is so thoroughly unlikable. He is not equivalent to Hope or
Walter, who were young and innocent. The distinction between
victim and murderer is not entirely artificial; it is not a social
construct, and any death penalty movie that suggests that it is
loses all credibility. Hope and Walter were young kids who had
their entire lives before them, until Poncelet (and Vitello) murdered them.
In the movie's penultimate scene, Poncelet says in his final
words that killing is wrong, regardless of whether the killer is
Poncelet or the State of Louisiana, 82 yet the faces of Hope and
Walter, superimposed on the glass partition that separates Poncelet from the witnesses, remind us that although all killing may
well be wrong, there are still degrees of evil. Their innocent visages do not dare let us equate their deaths with Poncelet's. As
Poncelet takes his final breaths, scenes of the rape-murder mingle with scenes of the execution, and there is no question which
is more violent, which is more horrific, which is more terrifying,
which is worse. Killing is not killing. That truth is certain. But
that truth does not entail that executions are just.
III. CONCLUSION: SHOULD INNOCENCE MATTER?
The Thin Blue Line and Fourteen Days in May are "real" in
the sense that they are documentaries, telling stories that are
nonfiction. They are real in the sense that states do send innocent men to death row, states do execute innocent men, and
these documentaries show us some. The documentaries are real
in the sense that their characters are not actors. And yet, in
many respects, the Hollywood movies are more real- more real
because they show us more, more real because they show us
guilty men. Like Dead Men Walking's Matthew Poncelet and
The Green Mile's Wild Bill, most men on death row did the act
that they are sent to death row for having done, and like Ponce-

82. In the movie's execution scene, DMW docs cheat just a little: when Poncclet
addresses the witnesses with his final statement, he is already strapped to the gurney,
which IS how it actually happens. but in the movie the guards swivel the gurney so that
Poncelet is upright. With his arms strapped to the gurney at 90 degree angles to his
torso, he looks like Jesus on the cross. That isn't how it's done in Louisiana, and the theatricality is a hit of cheating, yet it is forgivable because even as the lethal drug cocktail is
being administered, the faces of Poncclet's murder victims arc reflected in the execution
chamber glass.
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let, many death row inmates deny their guilt for many years, before seeking redemption in confession.
The Hollywood movies are more real because, unlike the
lawyers who represented Randall Dale Adams and unlike the
habeas lawyers who represented Edward Johnson, the trial lawyers who represented the killers in Dead Man Walking and The
Green Mile were dismal: Poncelet's lead counsel was a tax lawyer who had never before tried a capital case; he spent four
hours on jury selection-a process that, if done well, takes
weeks, if not months. In a trial that lasted five days, this lawyer
raised a single objection. Coffey's lawyer was just going through
the motions, infected with the same insidious attitude toward
black men that skewed the vision of so many southerners in the
1930s (and, sadly, today).
The Hollywood films are more real than the documentaries
because, if one wants to address the morality of the death penalty, then one must acknowledge that, while cases like Adams's
are chilling, they are far from typical. Ninety-nine percent of the
people on death row did what they have been convicted of. Perhaps the prospect of a one-percent error rate will cause some to
conclude that the death penalty ought to be abolished. That fact
alone, however, will not change most minds. If the objective is
to think about the morality of capital punishment per se, then it
is a distraction to choose a subject who is innocent. Dead Man
Walking eschews that distraction entirely; its subject is a particular and detestable guilty man who committed a particularly grisly
murder. The Green Mile includes an innocent man, but not at
the expense of overshadowing all the rest.
In contrast, The Thin Blue Line and Fourteen Days in May,
though exceedingly powerful films, have nothing to do with the
philosophical issue of the death penalty's moral legitimacy. To a
committed death penalty advocate, executing an occasional innocent man is simply the cost of doing business. The focus on
innocence is even worse than a distraction because it tends to legitimate the increasingly entrenched legal doctrine that holds
that unless an inmate can prove that he did not actually commit
the crime for which he was sentenced, then virtually any constitutional violation can be overlooked. 83 Surely innocence should
matter , but it should not be all that matters. Constitutional val-

83.

Calderon v. Coleman. 525 U.S. 141 (1998).
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ues and moral norms are not applicable only to the wrongly accused.
Dead Man Walking and The Green Mile tackle the moral issues frontally and without the distraction of innocence. Death
penalty advocates commonly offer three justifications for capital
punishment, and these films speaks to each of them. The first
justification is the so-called general deterrence rationale. The
idea of general deterrence is that when the state executes a convicted murderer, it sends the message to others thinking about
murder and discourages them from killing. Bank robbers, for
example, will load their guns with blanks instead of live ammunition so that when they brandish them during the course of a robbery no one will inadvertently get shot. But of course, it does
not take studies to prove that bank robbers rob because they
think they will not get caught. That is why bank robbers in
Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi still use bullets even though
these states show no hesitation in implementing the death penalty. (In Texas, the State carries out more than three executions
a month.) Matthew Poncelet and Wild Bill committed rape and
murder even though Louisiana has a death penalty and uses it. 84
The second reason cited in support of the death penalty is
specific deterrence. The idea of specific deterrence is that even
if executing a criminal does not send a message to murderers in
general that they had better not kill, it does send a message to a
particular murderer, i.e., the one who is executed. That murderer, at least, will never kill again. The specific deterrence rationale is compelling in a statistical sense, because it is true one
hundred percent of the time that executed murderers never
murder again. Matthew Poncelet and Wild Bill have killed their
final victims. But Poncelet, as well as all of the murderers shown
in TGM, were not murderous while in prison. These inmates
could have been stopped from killing again by keeping them at
Angola for the rest of their lives. 85 And in truth, even had any of

84. Moreover, executions occur so regularlv in America that they are not newsworthy. In Texas, where more than 230 men and one woman have been. put to death since
the death penalty resumed in 19il2, implementation of the death penalty is so commonso mundane- that the State "s largest newspapers no longer even send reporters to death
row when executions arc scheduled. If no one pays attention to the implementation of
the penalty, it is impossible for anyone to be deterred by it.
85. Of course, most states do not provide JUries in capital cases with the option of
true life without parole -an issue beyond the scope of DMW and TGM. Still it is noteworthy that although 75 percent of the public expresses support for capital punishment,
this figure drops significantly, by some 15 percent or more, when life without parole is
offered as an alternative punishment. This very fact goes a long way toward explaining
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these murderers ever been released on parole, it is by no means
clear that any would have tended to kill again, for there are no
reliable data indicating that murderers are likely to murder again
if they ever do get released from prison. On the contrary, of
more than a dozen death row inmates in Texas whose convictions were set aside on legal grounds and who were therefore released from prison, not a single one had committed another
murder in the following decade. 86
The final justification for the death penalty can be characterized as religious or retributive in nature: an eye for an eye.
The irony here is well-known: the moral premise of the retributive rationale is that it is wrong to murder, that it is immoral to
kill. So how can one who holds this view sanction a punishment
whereby the state kills? This is the question that tortures Walter
de la Croix's father, who cannot resist visiting Poncelet's grave. 87
Despite our norm condemning homicide, still we say that killing
is permitted in self defense, 88 but how does the killing of Poncelet implicate this exception? Homicide is an act that is inherently wrong, and this inherent wrongness does not evanesce
when the homicide is carried out by the state.
Among all of humanity, there is perhaps no stronger or
more universal norm than the proposition that killing is wrong.
The Thin Blue Line and, to a slightly lesser extent, Fourteen
Days in May, hold up an innocent man and say, "The death penalty may be acceptable in theory, but what about the wrongly
convicted?'' And in so doing, these two films manage to avoid
the issue of the death penalty altogether. Dead Man Walking
and, to a lesser extent, The Green Mile, hold up guilty men and
say that all this talk of innocence is a moral distraction. Death
row is full of guilty men, but they are yet men: human beings
who committed vile and despicable acts, yet still human beings.
why prosecutors and other proponents of the death penalty routinely struggle to defeat
legislative measures that would permit juries to sentence murderers to life without parole: they know that if jurors could sentence murderers to a real life term, they would be
far less likclv to sentence them to death.
86. This remarkable statistic is all the more noteworthy because a psychiatrist
called as a witness by the State testified at the trial of every one of these men that that he
was 100 percent certain that each would, if released, kill again. This psychiatrist, James
Grigson, is discussed above, in the section of this essay that addresses TBL.
87. I represented a man on death row who murdered a woman whose son, prior to
the murder of his mother, had been an active opponent of capital punishment. I do not
know whether the murder of his mother changcd his mind. I do know that he attended
every hearing and appellate argument, of whatever length, during the years of the appeaL
88. The deterrence rationale for the death penalty ts a htghly attenuated mstance ot
this exception.
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We in society have the legal power to kill these men when we act
through the fiction of the state, but we cannot elude moral restraints by funneling our actions through that fiction. If it is
wrong for the men (and women) on death row to have killed, it
is wrong for us to kill; if it is wrong for us to kill, it is wrong for
us to have the state kill on our behalves. That simple syllogism is
the essence of the moral objection to the death penalty. It is that
objection that death penalty documentaries, for all their greatness, entirely avoid; and it is that objection that the Hollywood
movies compel us to face.

